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DIRECTORS' STANDARD OF CARE AND DIRECTORS'
LIABILITY UNDER THE VIRGINIA STOCK
CORPORATION ACT
Business corporations are essential institutions in modem society.' The
inherent structure of corporations requires shareholders, directors, and
officers to participate in the governance of corporations. 2 As managers of
a corporation, directors and officers owe various duties to the corporation
and its shareholders.' One important duty of directors is the duty of care
that directors owe shareholders in the exercise of their powers as directors.
4
1. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWVS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BusiNEss
ENTERPRISES § 1, at 5 (3d ed. 1983)(because of size, power, and impact, modern business
corporations are indispensible to American and world economies).
2. See generally Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance,
73 CALIF. L. REv. 1671, 1671-72 (1985) (discussing role of shareholders in corporations).
Shareholders form the ownership base of a corporation and participate in the corporation by
electing the directors to serve on the corporate board. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 1, at § 188 (as owners of corporation, shareholders exercise control by voting at shareholder
meetings). The directors serving on the corporate board manage the corporation and formulate
corporate policy. See id. § 207 (management functions include making decisions on products
and services, selecting and supervising officers, declaring dividends, and supervising welfare of
entire enterprise). The officers of the corporation administer the policies set forth by the board
of directors in the daily business operations of the corporation. Id. § 223.
3. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 375 (2d Cir. 1980)(directors owe
duties to corporation and indirectly to shareholders). As managers of a corporation, officers
and directors have the duty to act within their statutory authority. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953 (Del. 1985)(noting that essential element for directors'
actions to bind corporation is power granted in corporate statute). Officers and directors also
are fiduciaries of the corporation and its shareholders and must discharge their duties with
honesty, loyalty, good faith, and fairness. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del.
1977). The duties that officers and directors as fiduciaries owe to the corporation and its
shareholders are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc.,
744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); see Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association,
Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1599-1604 (1978)[hereinafter Committee
on Corporate Laws](noting that directors, in making business decisions, must discharge
responsibilities with care and loyalty); infra note 5 and accompanying text (discussing duty of
care that directors owe corporation and its shareholders). The duty of loyalty that directors
and officers owe the corporation and its shareholders requires that directors and officers not
profit individually at the expense of the corporation or permit private interests to conflict with
interests of the corporation. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939)(directors
must not act to injure corporation or deprive corporation of profit and must not allow duty
to corporation and self-interest to conflict); Weiss Medical Complex, Ltd. v. Kim, 87 Ill. App.
3d 111, 115, 408 N.E.2d 959, 963 (1980)(directors must discharge duties with undivided and
unqualified loyalty and must not gain personally at expense of corporation); Committee on
Corporate Laws, supra, at 1599 (in allegiance to corporation, directors must place best interests
of corporation before own personal interests and must not use position as directors to benefit
personally).
4. See Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986)(directors owe corporation and shareholders duty of care in discharging managerial duties);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)(directors managing corporation have
unyielding fiduciary duty to corporation and shareholders).
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Traditionally, courts have interpreted the duty of care to require that
corporate directors exercise their duties as directors in good faith, without
a conflict of interest, on an informed basis, and with a reasonable belief
that their corporate decisions are in the best interests of the corporation.'
Courts customarily have afforded directors the rebuttable presumption under
the business judgment rule that in making corporate decisions, the directors
had satisfied the duty of care. 6 Recently, however, courts have altered the
traditional standard of care applicable to directors of corporations and
reviewed more closely the directors' corporate decisions involving takeovers.
7
5. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (imposing duty of care on
directors by affording directors' decisions as members of corporation's litigation committee
protection of business judgment rule when directors made decision on informed basis, in good
faith, and in honest belief that action was in best interests of corporation); Bodell v. General
Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 429, 140 A. 264, 268 (Del. 1927)(noting that courts will
not review directors' business decisions if directors reach decisions in good faith and in belief
that decision will advantage corporation and shareholders); see also Hinsey, Business Judgment
and the American Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine, and
the Reality, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 609, 610 (1984)(noting that directors seeking protection
of business judgment rule must act in good faith, make reasonable attempt to inform
themselves, reasonably believe that board's actions are in corporation's best interests, and not
engage in self-dealing). To fulfill the duty of care, officers and directors typically must perform
managerial assignments in good faith, with the care of ordinarily prudent persons in similar
circumstances, and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation.
REvISED MODEL BusiNEss CoRP,. ACT § 8.30(a) (1985); see infra notes 12-16 and accompanying
text (discussing standard of care in traditional business judgment rule); infra notes 26-29 and
accompanying text (discussing objective standard of care in Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (RMBCA)); infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text (discussing enhanced duty of care
that Delaware Supreme Court has imposed on directors involved in takeover situations). But
see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(directors' subjective standard of care in Virginia Stock
Corporation Act (VSCA)); infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing directors'
subjective standard of care in VSCA).
6. See Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568 (Del. Ch. 1977) (presuming directors'
sound business judgment to repurchase corporation's own stock and to value stock when
decisions had rational business purpose); Coffman v. Maryland Pub. Co., 167 Md. 275, 173
A. 248, 254 (1934)(deferring to business judgment of directors when directors honestly and
reasonably made decision); 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA oF THE LAW OF PRIvATE CoRPo-
RATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1986)(generally discussing business judgment rule); Hinsey,
supra note 5, at 610-12 (discussing business judgment rule and business judgment doctrine,
both of which protect directors' actions when directors have fulfilled duty of care); see also
infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing traditional business judgment rule); cf.
Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 A.2d 858, 888 (Del. 1985) (refusing to allow business judgment
rule to protect directors' decision to approve cash merger because court found directors
inadequately informed themselves).
7. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986)(requiring directors to show reasonableness of comprehensive defensive strategy to takeover
before affording board's decision protection of business judgment rule); Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985)(requiring directors to show reasonableness of
board's decision to adopt poison pill rights plan before affording board's decision to approve
prospective defensive strategy protection of business judgment rule); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 958-59 (Del. 1985)(requiring directors to prove reasonableness
of board's decision to authorize selective self-tender offer before allowing business judgment
1002
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Because of greater judicial scrutiny of directors' decisions, varying standards
of care, and the increasing risk of personal liability, qualified persons are
abandoning corporate boards or are hesitating to serve as corporate direc-
tors.8 In 1985, however, the Virginia General Assembly (General Assembly)
enacted the Virginia Stock Corporation Act (VSCA),9 which codifies a
rule to protect board's response to hostile tender offer); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
893 (Del. 1985)(imposing liability on corporate directors for gross negligence in authorizing
cash-out merger for low share price because directors did not act on informed basis).
8. See Baum & Byrne, The Job Nobody Wants, Bus. WK., Sept. 8, 1986, at 56
(acknowledging vulnerability to personal liability, outside corporate directors are reluctant to
accept positions on corporate boards). A director's duty of care is of vital interest to persons
serving on corporate boards, even though directors' decisions generally receive the protection
of the business judgment rule. See Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised
Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALl Project-A Strange Porridge, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 1483, 1485 (1985)(noting that routine decisions before corporate board and decisions that
directors clearly have authority to make present few difficulties for courts when applying
business judgment rule); infra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (discussing traditional business
judgment rule). Most claims before the courts alleging that directors have breached the duty
of care involve either derivative actions or takeover attempts. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-85 (Del. 1986)(determining whether
directors who adopted comprehensive defensive scheme to contest takeover breached duty of
care to shareholders); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350-57 (Del. 1985)(deciding
whether directors, in approving poison pill rights plan when actual struggle for corporation
did not exist, breached duty of care); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946,
955-59 (Del. 1985)(examining whether directors breached duty of care to shareholders when
directors authorized self-tender offer in response to hostile tender offer); Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 811-12 (Del. 1984)(addressing close relationship between futility of demand on
corporate board in derivative actions and directors' breach of duty of care when directors
decline to proceed with derivative action). In a derivative action, a plaintiff-shareholder who
has made a demand on the board to proceed with a claim on behalf of the corporation may
challenge the board's decision not to pursue the shareholder's claim as a breach of the
directors' duty of care. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981)(applying
business judgment rule to board's decision not to pursue shareholder's claim). In the context
of a challenge to directors' decisions involving takeovers, a plaintiff-shareholder may allege
that board members breached their duty of care in responding to a hostile tender offer. See
Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 949 (Del. 1985)(seeking to enjoin corporate
self-tender offer by claiming that directors breached duty of care to shareholders when directors
authorized self-tender offer in response to hostile tender offer).
9. VA. CODE ANr. § 13.1-601 to -800 (1985). In response to recent revisions to the
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), the General Assembly in 1983 instructed the Virginia
Code Commission to review chapters one and two of title 13.1 of the Code of Virginia, the
existing corporate code in Virginia, and recommend revisions that would clarify and organize
the Virginia corporate code. H.J. Res. 3, 1983 Va. Acts 1243; see Murphy, The New Virginia
Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 67, 68 n.1 (1985)(detailing history of
VSCA). After a thorough study of potential revisions, the Virginia Code Commission presented
to the Governor of Virginia and the General Assembly a report of the proposed revisions. See
VA. CODE COMM'N, REPORT ON THE REVIsION OF CHAPTERS 1 "D 2 OF TrrILE 13.1 OF THE
CODE OF Vmi GIA, H.R. Doc. No. 13 (1985)[hereinafter CODE CO iNi'N REPORT](containing
recommended revisions and comments on proposed changes from Virginia Bar Association).
After determining which proposed revisions to adopt, the General Assembly passed in February
1985 the VSCA, which became effective on January 1, 1986. See VA. CODE At. § 13.1-600
to -800 (1985)(VSCA); id. § 13.1-601 (effective date of VSCA is January 1, 1986).
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relatively low standard of care for corporate directors' ° and grants to
corporations broad powers to indemnify directors against a breach of the
codified standard of care."
The majority of courts, including courts applying Virginia law before
the VSCA, traditionally have required directors to satisfy an objective
standard of care under the business judgment rule.12 The business judgment
10. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(standard of care for directors in VSCA);
infra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia's statutory standard of care under
VSCA).
11. See VA. CODE AN. § 13.1-697 to -704 (1985) (indemnification provisions in VSCA);
infra notes 136-54 and accompanying text (examining indemnification provisions of VSCA).
12. See O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 927, 177 S.E. 852, 860
(1935)(finding that by placing control of clients' investments in hands of one person, directors
of investment corporation failed to exercise ordinary care and thus breached duty of care);
Anderson v. Bundy, 161 Va. 1, 21, 171 S.E. 501, 508 (1933)(holding bank directors liable for
not exercising due care in managing affairs of bank); Marshall v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Say.
Bank, 85 Va. 676, 686-87, 8 S.E. 586, 591-92 (1889)(holding bank directors liable for not
exercising ordinary care in overseeing affairs of bank); see also Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985)(finding that directors' decision to authorize cash-out merger for low
share price did not receive protection of business judgment rule because directors were grossly
negligent in approving merger); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)(when
directors exercised ordinary care in deciding not to proceed with shareholder's claim, directors'
decision falls within business judgment of directors); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 722 (Del. 1971)(directors' decision to declare and issue excessive dividends received
protection of business judgment rule because directors did not have improper motive or commit
corporate waste); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966)(because directors
acted reasonably in deciding to form new holding company, court granted directors' decision
protection of business judgment rule); Bodell v: General Gas & Elec. Corp., 140 A. 264, 268
(Del. 1927)(courts will not scrutinize directors' decisions made in good faith and for benefit
of corporation and its shareholders); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908-09
(Del. Ch. 1973)(when directors exercise ordinary care, business judgment rule protects directors'
decision to value corporation for purposes of merger); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
632-33, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001-02, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 928 (1979)(when shareholder alleges
directors have breached duty of care, business judgment rule applies to directors' decisions
that are reasonable); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 236-37, 43 N,E.2d 18, 21-22
(1942)(deferring to business judgment of directors who reasonably extended time for corpo-
ration's debtor to repay indebtedness); Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1439 (1985)(business judgment rule is basic principle in
corporate law). See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L.
Rav. 93 (1979)(comprehensively reviewing business judgment rule). Although courts universally
accept the business judgment rule as a defense to directors' decisions involving corporate
affairs, commentators have noted that courts have not been able to articulate a precise
definition of the rule. See Veasey & Seitz, supra note 8, at 1485 (presenting different courts'
definitions of business judgment rule); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del.
1984)(business judgment rule is presumption that directors made decision on informed basis,
in good faith, and in honest belief that action was in best interests of corporation); Sinclair
Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)(courts will not interfere with decision of
directors if directors' decision has rational business purpose); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d
487, 492-93 (Del. 1966)(courts will defer to business judgment of directors unless showing of
bad faith or gross abuse); Bodell v. General Gas & Elec, Corp., 140 A. 264, 268 (Del.
1927)(courts will not scrutinize directors' decisions made in good faith and for benefit of
corporation and its shareholders); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del.
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rule is a judicial presumption that the corporate directors have made an
informed decision and acted in good faith, without self-interest, and in the
sincere belief that the decision was in the best interests of the corporation.
3
Ch. 1973) (courts will not intervene with directors' business judgments made in good faith,
with honest motives, and for honest ends).
13. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see Veasey & Seitz, supra note 8,
at 1485 (business judgment rule is presumption favoring directors' decisions). To justify the
judicial presumption that in making corporate decisions directors exercised sound business
judgment, courts and commentators have suggested three underlying rationales. First, courts
have allowed directors the protection of the business judgment rule to give directors wide
latitude in managing the affairs of, and making decisions for, the corporation. See Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978)(to manage affairs of corporation
properly and efficiently, directors must have ample leeway in making corporate decisions);
Evangelist v. Fidelity Management & Research Co., 554 F. Supp. 87, 91 (D. Mass. 1982)(intent
of business judgment rule is to give directors freedom in managing affairs of corporation).
Second, courts defer to managerial decisions of directors because judges who are not competent
to make business decisions should not substitute their judgment for, or interfere with, the
judgment of corporate directors. See Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702
(2d Cir. 1980)(noting that courts are not qualified to make corporate business decisions);
Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926
(1979)(noting that courts have insufficient ability to make corporate business determinations).
Last, commentators suggest that judges should defer to actions by corporate directors because
directors will make overly cautious decisions regarding corporate affairs if courts unrestrictively
can review directors' decisions. See 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 1039 (business judgment
rule allows directors to take same type of risks in making corporate decisions that they would
take in personal affairs); Fischel, supra note 12, at 1439 (fear of personal liability influences
directors to act cautiously). Regardless of the justification for the rule, courts have allowed
directors to invoke the business judgment rule in derivative actions or in suits by shareholders
of corporations involved in takeovers or mergers as a defense to challenges of directors'
corporate decisions. See supra note 8 (noting recent cases involving derivative actions or
takeovers). In the context of derivative actions, the business judgment rule is important in a
shareholder's making demand on a corporation's board to proceed with a shareholder's claim
or in a court's excusing the requirement of demand. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec.
Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1978)(noting that independent directors' decision not to
proceed with shareholder's claim against corporation falls within protection of business
judgment rule when directors act in good faith and without self-interest); 3A W. FLETCHER,
supra note 6, § 1041.1 (examining business judgment rule's relationship to derivative actions).
The business judgment rule is also important in the context of derivative actions when courts
analyze a decision of a corporation's litigation committee to dismiss a shareholder's claim.
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)(affording directors' decisions as members
of corporation's litigation committee protection of business judgment rule when directors made
decision on informed basis, in good faith, and in honest belief that action was in best interests
of corporation). See generally Block & Prussin, Termination of Derivative Suits Against
Directors on Business Judgment Grounds: From Zapata to Aronson, 39 Bus. LAW. 1503
(1984)(comprehensively reviewing derivative actions involving directors and special litigation
committees).
In the context of takeovers, courts have applied the business judgment rule to determine
whether directors' actions in opposing a takeover are in the best interests of the corporation
or constitute a means of directors' maintaining control of the corporation. See, e.g., Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-84 (Del. 1986)(applying
business judgment rule to directors' decision to adopt rights plan and lock-up option as
defensive measures in takeover situation); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
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Thus, the business judgment rule potentially protects directors from liability
for actions taken while making decisions for the corporation. 4 The plaintiff-
shareholder alleging a breach of the duty of care may rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule by showing that in making a corporate
decision, directors acted in bad faith, failed to use ordinary care, or engaged
in self-dealing." Under the traditional business judgment rule, when a
plaintiff-shareholder has offered evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption
of the business judgment rule, the burden shifts to the directors to prove
the reasonableness of the directors' actions.
6
Although the majority of courts continue to apply the objective standard
of care under the business judgment rule, section 13.1-690 of the VSCA
1356-57 (Del. 1985)(allowing business judgment rule to protect directors' decision to approve
poison pill rights plan before actual takeover threat existed); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-59 (Del. 1985)(allowing business judgment rule to protect directors'
decision to authorize selective self-tender offer in response to hostile tender offer). Because of
the possibility for directors' self-interest in maintaining control of a corporation, Delaware
courts recently have placed an initial burden on directors to prove the reasonableness of the
corporate board's responsive or prospective defensive strategy. See infra notes 58-77 and
accompanying text (examining Unocal court's placing initial burden on directors in takeover
situations).
14. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173,
180-84 (Del. 1986)(applying business judgment rule to directors' decision to adopt rights plan
and lock-up option as defensive measures); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346,
1356-57 (Del. 1985)(allowing business judgment rule to protect directors who adopted poison
pill rights plan); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-59 (Del. 1985)(allowing
business judgment rule to protect directors' decision to authorize selective self-tender offer);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)(directors' decision not to proceed with
shareholder's claim falls within business judgment of directors); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971)(directors' decision to declare and issue excessive dividends
received protection of business judgment rule because directors did not have improper motive
or commit corporate waste); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966)(granting
protection of business judgment rule to directors' decision to form new holding company);
Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908-09 (Del. Ch. 1973)(business judgment
rule protects directors' decision to value corporation for purposes of merger); Everett v.
Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 236-37, 43 N.E.2d 18, 21-22 (1942)(deferring to business judgment of
directors who extended time for corporation's debtor to repay indebtedness); see also Veasey
& Seitz, supra note 8, at 1485 (discussing effect of business judgment rule).
15. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984)(person challenging decision
of directors has burden of proving facts that rebut presumption of directors' sound business
judgment); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966)(burden on plaintiff to
show directors' bad faith or abuse of discretion); 3A W. FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 1041.4
(discussing burden of proof under business judgment rule); Arsht, supra note 12, at 131 (courts
require plaintiff to prove directors' bad faith or self-dealing when directors invoke business
judgment rule as defense for corporate decision); see also infra note 16 (noting burden of
directors in proving reasonableness of board's actions).
16. See Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265 (2d Cir. 1984)(under
New York law, directors bear burden of proving reasonableness of board's actions after
plaintiff has shown bad faith or self-dealing); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
382 (2d Cir. 1980)(under New Jersey law, directors bear burden of proving reasonableness of
board's actions after plaintiff has shown bad faith, self-interest, or fraud); see also 3A W.
FLETCHER, supra note 6, § 1041.4 (discussing burden of proof under business judgment rule).
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codifies a subjective standard of care to which directors of Virginia cor-
porations must adhere in discharging their duties as corporate directors.
17
Section 13.1-690(A) of the VSCA provides an affirmative standard of care
that requires directors to perform their obligations as directors in "accord-
ance with their good faith business judgment of the best interests of the
corporation."' 8 In challenging directors' actions under section 13.1-690(A),
a plaintiff-shareholder must prove that the directors have breached the
statutory standard of care.' 9 The drafters of the VSCA intended that in
determining whether a plaintiff-shareholder satisfied the burden of proving
the directors' breach, courts should examine all of the circumstances sur-
rounding the board's decision to determine whether directors acted in the
good faith business judgment of the best interests of a corporation. 20 In
examining the evidence of the directors' alleged breach of the VSCA's duty
of care, a court must make a subjective inquiry into the directors' good
faith judgment.
2'
In addition to establishing a general standard of care in section 13.1-
690(A), the VSCA provides in section 13.1-690(B) a standard of conduct
for directors to follow when directors rely on information from other
individuals or groups in making corporate decisions. 22 Section 13.1-690(B)
17. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1985)(requiring corporate directors to act in
good faith business judgment in corporation's best interests); supra notes 12-16 and accom-
panying text (discussing traditional business judgment rule). But see Murphy, supra note 9, at
108 (noting that General Assembly substantially may have diluted standard of care in VSCA).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1985). Although the General Assembly did not define
the term "good faith" in § 13.1-690 of the VSCA, the term "good faith" generally means
honesty in intention. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 789 F.2d 1269, 1279 (7th
Cir. 1986)(recognizing that term "good faith" means honesty in fact); Efron v. Kalmanovitz,
249 Cal. App. 2d 187, , 57 Cal. Rptr. 248, 251 (1967)(noting that term "good faith" generally
denotes honesty of purpose and being faithful to duty or obligation); Doyle v. Gordon, 158
N.Y.S.2d 248, 259-60 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954)(noting that term "good faith" generally means
honesty in intention); cf. REviSED MODEL Busncmss CORP. ACT § 8.30(c) (1985)(establishing
circumstances when director acts in good faith). The standard in § 13.1-690(A) of the VSCA
applies both to directors' affirmative actions and to directors' failures to attend to their duties.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(C) (1985); see CODE COlat'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at
249-50 (standard of care in VSCA applies to directors' failure to act and to directors' actual
misconduct); Murphy, supra note 9, at 107-08 (standard of care in VSCA applies to both
actual and passive misconduct).
19. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(D) (1985)(placing burden of proof that directors
breached duty of care on person alleging directors' breach of duty of care).
20. Telephone interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of the VSCA (Feb.
12, 1987)(noting that VSCA implicitly instructs courts to ascertain whether directors breached
duty of care under VSCA by determining whether directors failed to make due inquiry, failed
to attend sufficiently to directorial responsibilities, or failed to read available reports relevant
to corporate decisions). '
21. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(providing that to satisfy standard of care
under VSCA, directors must act in good faith, rather than as ordinarily prudent persons); see
also CODE CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249 (noting that General Assembly's
failure to use term "reasonable" in standard of care provisions of VSCA eliminates comparison
of director's actions to idealized, objective standard).
22. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (1985)(authorizing directors to rely on information
that others furnish to corporation's board of directors in making decisions).
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authorizes directors to rely on information, opinions, reports, or statements
of other specified individuals or groups unless the directors possess actual
knowledge that makes reliance on the specific information unwarranted.Y
In addition, section 13.1-690(B) requires directors to believe in good faith
that the person giving the information or report is reliable and competent
regarding the specific matter relied upon.24 When the directors' reliance on
the information from the qualified individuals or groups is warranted and
in good faith, therefore, section 13.1-690(B) protects directors from any
liability that might arise because of false information furnished to the
directors.2
In contrast to the subjective standard of care provisions in the VSCA,
the standard of care provisions in the Revised Model Business Corporation
Act (RMBCA) contain an objective standard of care for directors. 26 Under
section 8.30(a) of the RMBCA directors must exercise their duties not only
in good faith, but also with the care of ordinarily prudent persons and in
a manner they reasonably believe to be in the best interest of the corpora-
tion.2 7 By requiring directors to act as ordinarily prudent persons, section
8.30(a) of the RMBCA requires a court to construct a hypothetical reason-
able man standard and to judge directors' actions against this objective
standard.2 The general duty of care under the RMBCA, therefore, implicitly
23. Id.; see Blain & Repp, Virginia's New Stock Corporation Act: A Farewell To
Forms, I1 VA. B.A.J. 9, 13 (1985)(directors' reliance on outside information is unwarranted
when directors possess information that questions reliability or competency of individuals
furnishing information). Under section 13.1-690(B) of the VSCA, a specified person is
1. One or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the director believes,
in good faith, to be reliable and competent in the matters presented;
2. Legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the director
believes, in good faith, are within the person's professional or expert competence;
or
3. A committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if the
director believes, in good faith, that the committee merits confidence.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-69003) (1985).
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-69003) (1985)(authorizing directors' reliance on infor-
mation of others and containing terms such as "reliable," "competent," "professional or
expert competence," and "merit[ing] confidence" to refer to individuals or committees); supra
note 23 (quoting reliance provision of VSCA); supra note 18 (noting that § 13.1-690 of VSCA
does not define term "good faith," but that good faith usually means honest in fact).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(C) (1985)(exculpating directors who satisfy standard
of care in § 13.1-690 of VSCA).
26. Compare REvIsED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT §8.30 (1985) (standard of care in
RMBCA requires court to devise hypothetical reasonable man standard in determining directors'
breach of duty of care); and infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing RMBCA's
standard of care); with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(standard of care in VSCA requires
court only to determine directors' good faith in ascertaining whether directors breached duty
of care); and supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (examining VSCA's standard of care
for directors).
27. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CoRP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1985).
28. Id.; see Murphy, supra note 9, at 105 (RMBCA embraces reasonable man standard
adopted from tort law). Under the RMBCA's standard of care a court must fabricate a factual
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requires directors to inform themselves of the matters upon which they are
acting because an ordinary person acting reasonably would become knowl-
edgeable regarding such matters. 29
In addition to imposing an objective standard of care on directors for
actions taken as corporate directors, the RMBCA in section 8.30(b) au-
thorizes directors to rely on other specified individuals or groups for
information.30 To rely on the information of specified individuals or groups
under the RMBCA, directors not only must comply with the objective
standard of care in section 8.30(a) of the RMBCA, but also reasonably
must believe in the reliability and competency of the individual or group
of individuals providing the information.3 Additionally, section 8.30(b) of
the RMBCA requires that directors inform themselves of the contents of
the information or report on which they rely, and that the directors have
no actual knowledge of relevant matter that would make reliance on another
individual or group unwarranted.32 After fulfilling the requirements in
section 8.30(b) of the RMBCA, directors may rely on information obtained
from others to make business decisions regarding all matters that are the
responsibility of the board of directors.
33
Comparing the VSCA's standard of care with the RMBCA's standard
of care applicable to the activities of corporate directors reveals two signif-
icant differences. The first difference is the absence in the VSCA of an
framework and compare directors' specific actions with the actions that ordinarily prudent
persons would exercise in the same situation and determine if the directors acted reasonably.
See REviSED MODEL Busn~ss CoRP. ACT § 8.30(a) (1985)(objective standard of care in
R1MBCA); Murphy, supra note 9, at 105 (noting that factual background includes time and
information constraints, makeup of board of directors, and board's role in corporate deci-
sionmaking).
29. See REVISED MODEL Busn Ess CoRP. ACT § 8.30 comment I (1985)(requiring directors
to exercise common sense, practical wisdom, and informed judgment, even if directors have
no particular business expertise).
30. See id. § 8.30(b) (establishing directors' standard of care for relying on information
that others supply to corporate board). A specified individual or group under the RMBCA
includes an officer or employee of the corporation, legal or financial professionals, other
experts, or an independent committee of the board of directors. Id. § 8.30(b); see VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-690(B) (1985)(listing persons on whom directors may rely for information or
reports); supra note 23 (quoting VSCA's provision imposing standard of care on directors
who rely on information furnished by others).
31. See REVISED MODEL BusnIEss CoRP. ACT § 8.30(b) (1985) (authorizing directors
making corporate decisions to rely reasonably on information of others); id. § 8.30 comment
2 (addressing requirements in RMBCA of directors' standard of care in relying on
information of others). By using the term "reasonable" throughout section 8.30(b) of the
RMBCA, the ABA Committee that drafted the RMBCA established an objective standard of
care for directors' reliance on others. See id. § 8.30(b) (objective standard for directors'
reliance on others in making corporate decisions).
32. See id. § 8.30 comment 2 (section 8.30(b) of RMBCA requires that to rely on
information or reports of others, directors must become familiar with information or reports'
contents); id. § 8.30(c) (establishing that to act in good faith, directors must not possess actual
knowledge that makes reliance on others' information unwarranted).
33. Id. § 8.30 comment 2.
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objective standard of reasonableness for evaluating directors' decisions.3 4 In
enacting section 13.1-690 of the VSCA, the General Assembly intended to
enact a standard of care that did not require the court to assess directors'
conduct against an idealized reasonable man standard.15 The General As-
sembly, instead, intentionally avoided using the term "reasonable" in section
13.1-690 of the VSCA to circumvent problems that courts might have in
determining an allowable degree of deviation from the idealized standard.
3 6
Placing great significance on circumstantial evidence concerning the direc-
tors' decision, the General Assembly intended courts considering the liability
of directors for corporate decisions to inquire only about the directors'
good faith belief of what is in the best interests of the corporation. 7 The
General Assembly did not contemplate, however, imposing a purely subjec-
tive standard on directors' managerial decisions because the General Assem-
bly realized that courts may consider reasonableness. But by not using the
34. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(imposing subjective good faith requirement
on directors in managing corporate affairs); cf. REVISED MODEL BusINEss CORP. ACT § 8.30
(1985) (imposing on directors making corporate decisions subjective requirement to act in good
faith and objective requirements to act with care of ordinarily prudent persons in similar
circumstances and in manner believed to be in best interests of corporation).
35. See CODE CoMm'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249 (subjective standard of
care in VSCA does not require comparison of director conduct to hypothetical reasonable man
standard); Murphy, supra note 9, at 106 (standard of care under VSCA appears simple by
imposing only two requirements on directors acting for corporation because VSCA requires
only good faith and business judgment in corporation's best interests).
36. See CODE COmm'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249 (absence of term "reason-
able" in VSCA's standard of care removes necessity of courts' comparing directors' actions
with idealized standard); Murphy, supra note 9, at 108 (noting complication and artificiality
of RMBCA's objective standard of care for directors). But see Murphy, supra note 9, at 106
(courts may have difficulty construing limits of good faith requirement).
37. CODE COmm'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249; Telephone interview with Allen
C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of VSCA (Feb. 12, 1987)(in determining directors' good
faith under VSCA, courts should consider circumstantial evidence, such as directors' attempt
to make due inquiry, to attend sufficiently to directors' responsibilities, or to read available
accounts). The language of the VSCA's standard of care indicates that a court should not
compare directors' actions with the actions of reasonable men. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
690 (1985)(lacking language indicating tort law's reasonable man standard); CODE CoMo'N
REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249-50 (General Assembly intentionally avoided using terms
"reasonable" or "ordinary" in VSCA's standard of care); Manning, The Business Judgment
Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time for Reality, 39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1493
(1984)(difficulty with tort law's reasonable man standard is that no clear perception of what
constitutes reasonable action for directors exists); Murphy, supra note 9, at 108 (court should
not compare directors' actions with actions of reasonable men because directors' own good
faith and business judgment comprise only requirements under VSCA's standard of care).
38. Telephone interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of VSCA (Feb. 12,
1987)(commenting that court may consider reasonableness of directors' decision in determining
directors' good faith); see CODE CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249 (recognizing
that directors' good faith partially depends on reasonableness of directors' decisions). In
interpreting the standard of care in the VSCA, one commentator has argued that rational
conduct is an assumed element of the standard. See Murphy, supra note 9, at 109 (directors
have difficulty proving that irrational acts are in best interests of corporation because statutory
standard requires action in best interests of corporation).
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term "reasonable" in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA, the General Assembly
did not require the court to construct an elaborate reasonable man frame-
work for measuring the directors' conduct.
3 9
The second significant difference between directors' standards of care
under the RMBCA and the VSCA is that although the American Bar
Association's Committee on Corporate Laws (ABA Committee), which
drafted the RMBCA, did not intend to codify the business judgment rule
in section 8.30 of the RMBCA, the General Assembly intended to codify
the business judgment rule in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA. 40 In proposing
the directors' standard of care in section 8.30 of the RMBCA, the ABA
Committee acknowledged that courts have not developed completely the
business judgment rule.4' The ABA Committee concluded, therefore, that a
uniform codification of the business judgment rule in the RMBCA was not
possible. 42 According to the ABA Committee, section 8.30 of the RMBCA
simply contains a general standard of care for directors to which directors
must adhere in making corporate decisions. 43 When a court determines that
directors satisfy the standard of care under section 8.30 of the RMBCA in
making a corporate decision, the RMBCA protects the directors from
liability for the corporate decision. 44 Even when a court finds that directors
do not satisfy the standard of care in section 8.30 of the RMBCA, however,
the directors may rely on the traditional business judgment rule for protec-
tion from liability.
45
In enacting section 13.1-690 of the VSCA, however, the General Assem-
bly attempted to bring the standard of care in section 13.1-690 into con-
39. CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249; cf. REVISED MODEL BUsnEss
CoRP. ACT § 8.30 (1985)(requiring courts to measure directors' conduct against objective
standard of reasonableness).
40. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(VSCA's standard of care provision contains
term "business judgment"); cf. REviSED MODEL Busn Ess CoRP. ACT § 8.30 general comment
(1985)(explicitly rejecting directors' standard of care as attempt to codify business judgment
rule).
41. REVISED MODEL BusqmEss CoRP. ACT § 8.30 general comment (1985)(ABA Committee
refusing to codify business judgment rule because courts constantly are developing directors'
standard of care and circumstances when courts should apply business judgment rule are
changing).
42. Id.
43. Id. § 8.30 comment 1.
44. See id. § 8.30(d) (absolving directors from liability when directors fulfill duty of
care); id. § 8.30 general comment (noting that directors are not liable for actions when directors
satisfy standard of care).
45. See D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BusnEss JUDGMENT RULE 24-25
(1987)[hereinafter BLOCK & BARTO](noting that directors who breach standard of care under
RMBCA may not be liable because greater culpability than breach of statutory standard of
care is necessary to impose liability on directors); Hinsey, supra note 5, at 614 (noting that
courts have held that directors have breached duty of care by not acting as reasonable persons,
but have escaped liability by acting in good faith); Manning, supra note 37, at 1479 n.2
(noting that drafters of MBCA's standard of care for directors were uncertain whether breach
of duty of care would result in directors' legal liability); supra notes 12-16 and accompanying
text (discussing traditional business judgment rule).
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formity with the common-law business judgment rule. 46 Recognizing that
directors usually reach corporate decisions by consensus and under time
restrictions, the General Assembly intended for courts to defer to directors'
decisions when the directors satisfied the standard of care under section
13.1-690 of the VSCA. 47 In addition, the General Assembly intended to
deter courts from using hindsight to re-evaluate the decisions of corporate
boards.48 When directors satisfy the standard of care in section 13.1-690 of
the VSCA, the VSCA protects the directors from liability for the corporate
decision. 49 When directors breach the standard of care in section 13.1-690
of the VSCA, however, they should not be able to rely upon the business
judgment rule for exoneration because the General Assembly attempted to
merge the business judgment rule into section 13.1-690 of the VSCA.5 0
Because the standard of care in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA is new,
Virginia courts have not had the opportunity to apply the standard to
directors' actions. In applying the standard of care under section 13.1-690,
Virginia courts may seek guidance from recent cases in Delaware-a leading
state for corporation law-whose courts apply the traditional business
judgment rule." Although the traditional business judgment rule in Virginia
and other jurisdictions affords directors the rebuttable presumption of sound
46. Telephone interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of VSCA (Feb. 12,
1987)(General Assembly basically intended to codify business judgment rule in enacting standard
of care in VSCA).
47. Id. According to the primary drafter of the VSCA, the circumstances surrounding
directors' decisions significantly influenced the General Assembly's adoption of a directors'
standard of care that attempted to codify the business judgment rule. Id. (referring to Manning,
supra note 37, at 1477). The General Assembly recognized the realities that severely restrict
the decisionmaking process of corporate boards, including the corporate boards' time con-
straints, the complexity of corporate enterprises, management's control of board meetings, the
limited participation by corporate directors, the reaching of decisions by consensus, and the
directors' reliance on others' reports. Telephone interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary
Drafter of VSCA (Feb. 12, 1987)(referring to Manning, supra note 37, at 1477); see Manning,
supra note 37, at 1481-91 (noting that realities of directors' actions in corporate boardroom
do not conform to objective, conceptual theory).
48. Telephone Interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of VSCA (Feb.
12, 1987); see supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text (examining traditional business
judgment rule).
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985).
50. Telephone Interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of VSCA (Feb.
12, 1987). But see supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that directors may fall within
protection of business judgment rule even though directors have breached traditional standard
of care in RMBCA).
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985); see H. HiNN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, §
93 (noting that Delaware corporate statute is flexible basis for corporate action, is most
accommodating corporate statute to corporations, and has resulted in well-settled corporate
law); Schmidt, Md. Bill Would Cut Liability of Corporation Directors, Wash. Post, Feb. 5,
1987, at 1, col. 5 (referring to Delaware as "mecca" for corporations in reporting that
Maryland legislature may adopt new corporate liability law); supra note 6 and accompanying
text (discussing traditional business judgment rule); supra note 7 (noting recent Delaware
Supreme Court decisions involving directors' standard of care in takeover situations).
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business judgment, the Delaware Supreme Court recently has reviewed more
closely the decisions of corporate directors in takeover situations. 2 In
analyzing directors' actions to prevent takeovers, the Delaware Supreme
Court has determined initially whether a board of directors has the authority
to adopt specific defensive measures that oppose takeover attempts. 3 In-
voking both statutory and case law, the Delaware Supreme Court has
recognized that a board of directors possesses the authority to manage the
business and affairs of the corporation and the obligation to protect the
corporation and its shareholders from harm. 4 The Delaware Supreme Court
has acknowledged, therefore, the authority of a corporate board to contest
a takeover when the board reasonably concludes that the takeover is not in
the best interests of the corporation. 5 Although recognizing the authority
of corporate directors to contest corporate takeovers, the Delaware Supreme
Court has altered the burden of proof in applying the business judgment
rule to directors' decisions involving takeovers. 6 Instead of initially deferring
to decisions of corporate directors, the Delaware Supreme Court in recent
decisions has placed a threshold burden on corporate directors to show the
reasonableness of their responses to takeover attempts.
5 7
52. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-98 (Del. 1985)(closely analyzing
decisionmaking process of board of directors in takeover situation and not allowing business
judgment rule to protect directors who authorized cash-out merger for low share price); supra
note 7 (noting recent Delaware cases in which Delaware Supreme Court closely has scrutinized
actions of directors of corporations involved in takeovers); supra notes 12-16 and accompanying
text (discussing common-law standard of care under traditional business judgment rule).
53. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del.
1986)(before considering application of traditional business judgment rule, court found that
directors had authority to adopt comprehensive defensive strategy in response to specific
takeover); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985)(before determining
whether traditional business judgment rule applied to directors' decision to adopt poison pill
rights plan, court found that directors had authority to approve rights plan for prospective
corporate threat); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)(finding
that directors had authority to adopt selective self-tender offer as response to hostile tender
offer before considering whether traditional business judgment rule applied to directors' decision
approving self-tender).
54. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (noting cases in which Delaware Supreme
Court has examined authority of corporate board to contest takeovers); see also Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 297 (7th Cir. 1981)(corporate board has duty to
shareholders to protect corporate enterprise from reasonably perceived harm); Crouse-Hinds
Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 704 (2d Cir. 1980)(board of directors has obligation to
protect corporation from harm); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974)(board of directors has
duty and responsibility to manage business and affairs of corporation).
55. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 179 (noting that even when corporation involved in
takeover, corporate directors required to act in best interests of corporation); Moran, 500
A.2d at 1356 (requiring directors to act in best interests of corporation); Unocal, 493 A.2d at
954 (noting that in managing affairs of corporation, directors' duty is to act in best interests
of corporation even when corporation faces takeover); supra note 54 and accompanying text
(discussing general authority of corporate board to manage affairs of corporation).
56. See infra notes 65-77 and accompanying text (examining how Delaware Supreme
Court in Unocal shifted burden to defendant directors to prove initial reasonableness of board's
response to takeover).
57. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180 (requiring directors to show reasonableness of
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For example, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co." the Delaware
Supreme Court considered whether the business judgment rule protected a
corporate board's decision to reject a hostile tender offer and to adopt a
selective self-tender offer that excluded the shareholder making the hostile
offer.5 9 In Unocal the board of directors of Unocal Corp. (Unocal) met
and considered a tender offer by Mesa Petroleum Co. (Mesa), which owned
thirteen percent of Unocal's outstanding common stock, to purchase an
additional thirty-seven percent of Unocal's stockA" After consulting with
legal and financial advisors, the Unocal directors resolved to oppose Mesa's
tender offer.6' Two days later, the Unocal board adopted a selective self-
tender offer in which Unocal would purchase, upon Mesa's successful
acquisition of thirty-seven percent of Unocal's outstanding common stock,
forty-nine percent of its own outstanding common stock in an exchange for
debt securities having an aggregate par value of seventy-two dollars per
note.6 2 Mesa prevented Unocal from purchasing its own stock, however, by
comprehensive defensive strategy in response to specific takeover before applying traditional
business judgment rule); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (requiring directors to bear burden of
proving reasonableness of decision to approve poison pill rights plan for prospective corporate
threat before applying traditional business judgment rule); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (requiring
directors to prove reasonableness of selective self-tender offer as response to hostile tender
offer before applying traditional business judgment rule).
58. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
59. Id. at 955-59.
60. Id. at 949-50. In Unocal, Mesa Petroleum Co. (Mesa), a 13% shareholder in Unocal
Corporation (Unocal), made a two-tier cash tender offer for an additional 37% of Unocal's
outstanding common stock. Id. at 949. A two-tier tender offer consists of a cash tender offer
for outstanding stock of a corporation in the first tier and an offer to exchange the remaining
outstanding stock of a corporation with securities having a value below the value of the cash
tender offer in the second tier. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STENBERGER, TAKEOVERS & FREEZEOUTS §
1.07[4][c] (1986). In Mesa's hostile tender offer Mesa's first tier consisted of an offer to pay
$54 in cash per share of Unocal stock. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949. The second tier of Mesa's
tender offer involved an offer to exchange debt securities and preferred stock for the remaining
outstanding common stock of Unocal. Id. at 950 n.3. In offering the exchange of debt securities
for common stock, Mesa intended to eliminate the publicly held common shares of Unocal.
Id. at 949.
61. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950-51. In Unocal the corporate board of Unocal, consisting
of eight outside directors and six inside directors, received advice from Unocal's counsel who
instructed the board on the directors' legal obligations under Delaware corporate law and
federal securities law in considering tender offers. Id. at 950. In addition to the legal counsel's
presentation, an investment banker who represented two leading investment banking firms
presented to the board a detailed analysis of the Mesa tender offer, the bases of the investment
banking firms' opinion of the offer, and possible defensive measures available to Unocal's
board. Id. The investment banker advised the Unocal board that the Mesa tender offer was
wholly inadequate because the value of 100% of Unocal stock exceeded $60 per share. Id. In
addition to advising the Unocal board to reject the hostile tender offer, the investment banker
proposed to the Unocal board possible defensive strategies, including a self-tender offer by
Unocal with a price range of $70-$75 per share of stock. Id. After the presentations by legal
counsel and the investment banker, the Unocal board resolved to reject the Mesa tender offer
and adjourned the board meeting, which had lasted for 9 1/2 hours. Id.
62. Id. at 950-51. In Unocal, Unocal's Vice-President of Finance, Assistant General
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petitioning successfully the Delaware Court of Chancery for a preliminary
injunction.6 1 Challenging the court of chancery's conclusion that the selective
self-tender offer legally was impermissible because the selective self-tender
offer was not fair to all stockholders, Unocal appealed to the Delaware
Supreme Court.64
On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal invoked a heightened
standard of care to judge the decisions of the Unocal directors.65 The Unocal
court noted that Delaware statutory law authorized a corporate board to
trade in the corporation's own stock and that Delaware common law allowed
a board to oppose takeovers.6 6 The Unocal court also noted that Delaware
courts traditionally defer to a corporate board's decision having a rational
business purpose6 7 The Delaware Supreme Court explained, however, that
directors involved in a takeover have an inherent conflict of interest to
maintain control of the corporation to further their own interests rather
than the corporation's interests .6  The Unocal court determined, therefore,
that when a plaintiff-shareholder challenges a corporate board's decision to
Counsel, and investment bankers presented to the corporate board a detailed analysis of the
self-tender offer. Id. After these presentations, the Unocal board resolved that if Mesa acquired
37076 of Unocal's outstanding stock (Mesa Purchase Condition), Unocal would purchase the
remaining 490%6 of Unocal's outstanding common stock with debt securities valued at $72 per
share of stock. Id. at 951. The Unocal board also resolved to exclude Mesa from the self-
tender offer. Id.
63. Id. at 951. In Unocal the Unocal board met to review the board's self-tender offer
shortly after Mesa filed suit to enjoin Unocal from exchanging common stock for debt. Id.
During this meeting of the Unocal board, Unocal's investment bankers advised the Unocal
directors to remove the Mesa Purchase Condition from the tender offer (waiver of Mesa
Purchase Condition), to sell their own stock as a showing of confidence in the self-tender
offer, and to review Mesa's exclusion from the self-tender offer to ascertain a legitimate
corporate purpose. Id. After the board meeting Unocal issued a supplement to the self-tender
offer that described the waiver of the Mesa Purchase Condition and extended the expiration
dates of the self-tender offer. Id. The Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Court of Chancery
issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting Unocal from excluding Mesa from the self-
tender offer. Id. at 952. The Vice Chancellor, subsequently, granted Mesa a preliminary
injunction prohibiting Unocal's selective self-tender offer. Id.
64. Id. at 953.
65. See id. at 954-55 (court determined that because directors have inherent conflict of
interest in struggle for control of corporation, court's analysis must begin with determining
whether directors involved in takeover can make objective decision).
66. Id. at 953-54; see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)(noting
that court will not substitute own judgment for directors' judgment having rational business
purpose); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (1974)(authorizing corporation to trade in
corporation's own stock); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing authority of
corporate board to oppose takeover).
67. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954; see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del.
1971)(noting that court will not substitute own judgment for directors' judgment having
rational business purpose).
68. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (noting that directors involved in takeovers have
conflict of interest because directors sometimes act to remove threat to directors' own control
of corporation, rather than to remove threat to corporation and shareholders).
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contest a takeover, the directors must bear the initial burden of showing
the reasonableness of their managerial decision.69
The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal determined that to show the
reasonableness of managerial actions contesting a takeover, directors first
must prove that they reasonably perceived a threat to the corporation70
The court in Unocal noted that by showing good faith and reasonable
investigation, directors satisfy the threshold burden of proving a reasonable
belief of a corporate threat.7' The Unocal court found that Unocal's directors
had concluded in good faith and after reasonable investigation that Mesa's
tender offer was grossly inadequate. 72 The Delaware Supreme Court then
found that the Unocal directors reasonably had perceived a threat to the
corporation.
73
The Unocal court next determined that after directors involved in a
takeover show a reasonably perceived threat to the corporation, the directors
must prove that the corporate board's response to the reasonably perceived
threat was reasonable. 74 The Unocal court found that the directors of Unocal
sought to protect Unocal shareholders by adopting the self-tender offer and
that if Unocal allowed Mesa to participate in the self-tender offer, the self-
69. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (noting that directors involved in takeovers sometimes
act to fruther personal, rather than corporate, interests); infra notes 70-77 and accompanying
text (discussing requirement that directors prove reasonably perceived corporate threat and
reasonable response to takeover threat). Although the Unocal court specifically did not indicate
any shift of the burden of proof other than requiring the directors initially to prove reason-
ableness of the board's actions, the Delaware Supreme Court in another recent takeover case
noted that after directors have proved the reasonableness of their actions, the burden shifts
to the plaintiff-shareholder to prove that the directors did not comply with the directors'
fiduciary duties. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (shifting back to plaintiff-shareholder ultimate
burden of persuasion that directors breached duty of care in defending corporation from
takeover attempt).
70. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
71. Id. In Unocal the Delaware Supreme Court noted that because the Unocal board
consisted of a majority of outside directors, the board was independent. Id. The Unocal court
noted that the independence of the Unocal board substantially strengthened the reasonableness
of the board's decision to approve the self-tender offer. Id.
72. Id. at 956. In Unocal the Unocal directors found that because the value of the
corporation far exceeded Mesa's $54 per share price, Mesa's tender offer was inadequate. Id.
73. Id. In Unocal the Unocal directors concluded that Mesa's inadequate price was
harmful to the interests of Unocal shareholders and that the debt securities in Mesa's two-tier
tender offer were junk bonds that had a value far below $54 per share of stock. See id.
(commenting that use of junk bonds forces stockholder to tender stock to tender offeror for
inadequate share price in first tier because of threat that shareholders otherwise will receive
overvalued debt securities in second tier). Unocal's directors recognized that, moreover, a
renowned "greenmailer" had threatened the corporate enterprise. See id. (noting that green-
mailer is person threatening to takeover corporation solely to make large profits when
corporation, to prevent takeover, purchases stock back from greenmailer at substantial pre-
mium).
74. Id. at 955. The Unocal court noted that to determine whether a board's response
to a takeover is reasonable, the directors must analyze the nature of the takeover bid and the
impact on the corporation. Id.
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tender offer would not deter Mesa. 75 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded
that in rejecting Mesa's tender offer and approving a selective self-tender
offer, the Unocal board of directors had responded reasonably to Mesa's
threat to Unocal. 76 The Delaware Supreme Court held, therefore, that the
business judgment rule protected the decision of the Unocal board to reject
Mesa's hostile tender offer and to adopt the selective self-tender offer.
7
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.78 the Delaware Supreme
Court further modified the business judgment rule by imposing Unocal's
heightened burden on a directors' decision to adopt a prospective antitake-
over mechanism." In Moran the board of directors of Household Inter-
national, Inc. (Household) believed that Household had become generally
vulnerable as a possible target for a takeover. 0 Although not presented with
a specific takeover threat, the Household board, after seeking advice from
legal counsel and financial experts, adopted a poison pill rights plan"' that
entitled Household's common shareholders to receive a dividend of one
right for each share of Household common stock.12 The Household rights
75. Id. at 956. In Unocal the directors adopted the selective self-tender offer either to
defeat Mesa's hostile tender offer of an inadequate price or to provide senior debt to remaining
shareholders if Mesa purchased 37%o of Unocal's outstanding common stock. Id. The Unocal
court noted, however, that Unocal's attempt to protect shareholders would have been futile
had the Unocal board allowed Mesa to participate in the self-tender offer. See id. (noting that
Mesa was not within class of Unocal shareholders that Unocal board tried to protect with
self-tender offer).
76. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal board's intent in
adopting selective self-tender offer).
77. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 959.
78. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
79. See id. at 1350 (shifting burden to directors to prove reasonableness of board's
decision to adopt prospective poison pill rights plan).
80. Id. at 1349. In Moran Household's directors, responding to a perceived susceptibility
to a takeover, engaged legal and financial expertise to devise a prospective defensive scheme.
Id.
81. See generally S. LoRNE, AcQuIsITIoNs AND MERGERS: NEGOTIATED AND CONTESTED
TRANSACTIONS § 4.05[l][d] (1986)(discussing poison pill redemption provisions as defensive
measure against tender offers); Fogelson, Some Recent Defensive Strategies in Corporate
Takeovers, in 1 PLI, HOSTILE BATTLES FOR COR'ORATE CONTROL 1985 191-208 (D. Block
& H. Pitt eds. 1985)(PLI Corporate Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 474)(examining
poison pill rights plan as defensive mechanism against takeovers); Note, Moran and The
Poison Pill: A Target's Savior? 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 955, 955-63 (1986)(examining poison
pill rights plans as defense to takeover attempts). Under a typical poison pill rights plan, the
corporation targeted for a takeover (target corporation) distributes as a dividend to its
shareholders rights that entitle the rightsholder to purchase common or preferred stock of the
target corporation when events specified in the rights plan occur. S. LoRNE, supra, §
4.05[I][d]. The events that typically trigger the execution of the rights are a tender offer for
the outstanding common stock of the target corporation or the accumulation of a certain
amount of shares of the target corporation. Id. Upon the consumation of a merger or other
business comination of the target company with an acquiring entity, poison pill rights plans
typically allow rightsholders to purchase stock of the surviving entity at a substantial discount,
which renders the target company less attractive to potential acquirors. Id.
82. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. Each right in the rights plan in Moran allowed a
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plan provided that upon a merger or other combination of Household with
an outside acquiror, each rightsholder could purchase stock of the acquiring
entity at one-half the market value of the acquiror's stock." In response to
the board's approval of the prospective defensive mechanism, the plaintiff,
a Household director and shareholder, unsuccessfully challenged the validity
of the rights plan in the Delaware Court of Chancery and appealed to the
Delaware Supreme Court.
8 4
On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court imposed Unocal's enhanced
standard of care on Household's corporate directors.85 After determining
that Delaware statutory law authorized the board to adopt the rights plan,86
the court in Moran considered whether the business judgment rule protected
the Household directors' approval of the poison pill rights plan.8 7 Relying
on Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran required the Household
directors to articulate the reasonableness for adopting the defensive mech-
anism, even though Household was not contesting a specific takeover.88 In
rightsholder to purchase, for an exercise price of $100, 1/100 of a share of new preferred
Household stock. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1066 (Del. Ch. 1985). In
addition, for any rightsholder in Moran to exercise the rights, a person or entity either must
announce a tender offer for 30% of Household's outstanding common stock or acquire, as
an individual or a single entity, 20% of Household's outstanding common shares. Moran, 500
A.2d at 1349.
83. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1349. Under the Moran rights plan, if a rightsholder did not
exercise the holder's rights, and a merger or other business combination between Household
and a tender offeror subsequently occurred, the rights entitled the holder to purchase common
stock of the tender offeror for 50% of the stock's value. Id.
84. Id. at 1349-50. In Moran the Delaware Court of Chancery upheld the Moran
board's decision to approve a poison pill rights plan. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 490
A.2d 1059, 1082 (Del. Ch. 1985). The court of chancery found that the Moran board's motive
in approving the rights plan was to further a rational business purpose, rather than to entrench
management. Id.
85. See Moran. 500 A.2d at 1350-57 (requiring directors to have authority for actions
responding to takeover and initially to show reasonableness of actions attacking takeover
attempt); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (requiring enhanced duty of care for directors involved
in takeover context); supra notes 58-77 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal).
86. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351 (before considering application of business judgment
rule, court noted general authority of directors to approve rights plan under Delaware law
that authorizes corporations to issue rights entitling rightsholders to purchase shares and to
issue shares of stock); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1974)(authorizing corporations to
issue shares of stock); id. § 157 (authorizing corporations to issue rights to purchase shares
of stock); supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing authority of boards of Delaware
corporations to manage business and affairs of corporation).
87. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355-57.
88. Id. at 1356; see Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-55 (requiring directors to show reasona-
bleness of decision to oppose takeover attempt). In Moran a majority of the Household board
that approved the decision to adopt the rights plan were outside directors. Moran, 500 A.2d
at 1356. The Delaware Supreme Court noted that the independence of the corporate board
substantially strengthened the reasonableness of the board's decision to approve the poison
pill rights plan. Id. The Moran court also recognized that by anticipating rather than reacting
to a possible takeover, the Household board reduced the risk that the directors would fail to
use reasonable business judgment because the directors were not under pressure to respond to
a threatening takeover. Id. at 1350.
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examining whether the directors reasonably perceived a threat to Household,
the Moran court found that the plaintiffs did not allege that the directors
acted in bad faith and that the Household directors, in seeking legal and
financial advice, had made a reasonable investigation of the general takeover
environment in the market.8 9 The Delaware Supreme Court concluded,
therefore, that the Household directors reasonably perceived a threat to the
corporation.9" In examining the reasonableness of the directors' response to
the corporate threat, the Delaware Supreme Court found that because the
directors had expressed concern regarding the increasing frequency of take-
overs and Household's perceived vulnerability to takeovers, the poison pill
rights plan was a reasonable response to the corporate threat. 9' The Delaware
Supreme Court held, therefore, that the business judgment rule protected
the Household board's decision to adopt the rights plan.92
In the most recent Delaware decision altering the traditional business
judgment rule, the Delaware Supreme Court considered whether the business
judgment rule protected a board's decision to adopt a comprehensive
defensive strategy to deter a specific hostile takeover attempt.93 In Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,94 Pantry Pride, Inc. (Pantry
Pride) entered a bidding contest for the stock of Revlon, Inc. (Revlon). 95
To oppose Pantry Pride, Revlon sought as a white knight 96 the investment
89. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; see supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing
Unocal court's requirement that directors show reasonableness of board's perceived threat to
corporation). In Moran the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that in addition to not
asserting directors' bad faith, the plaintiff-shareholder did not assert that the directors' motive
was to entrench management. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356. The Moran court found that the fear
of two-tiered takeovers motivated the Household directors to adopt the poison pill rights plan.
Id.; see supra note 60 (explaining two-tier tender offer). The court in Moran concluded that,
furthermore, the directors' decision to approve the rights plan was informed. Moran, 500
A.2d at 1356. To determine whether the directors reached an informed decision to adopt the
rights plan, the court in Moran judged the directors' actions against a standard of gross
negligence. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court found that the directors were not grossly negligent
in adopting the rights plan because the directors received a written summary of the rights plan
and the stock market's takeover environment and sought legal and financial advice regarding
the rights plan. Id. at 1357.
90. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (noting that Household board adopted rights plan in
response to general environment of coercive tender offers).
91. Id. at 1357.
92. Id.
93. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180-84
(Del. 1986)(examining whether directors' resolution to approve defensive scheme opposing
takeover was reasonable).
94. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
95. Id. at 175-79. In Revlon Pantry Pride expressed to Revlon the possibility of a
friendly acquisition of Revlon, or the potential for a hostile takeover if the friendly acquisition
failed. Id. at 175-76. In response to Pantry Pride's interest, the Revlon board searched for a
white knight. Id. at 178;'see infra note 96 (explaining term "white knight"). Both Pantry
Pride and Revlon's white knight bid on Revlon's outstanding common stock. Revlon, 506
A.2d at 178-79.
96. See BLOCK & BARTON, supra note 45, at 91 (explaining concept of white knight in
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banking firm of Forstmann Little & Co. (Forstmann Little). 97 Additionally,
pursuant to the advice of legal and financial experts,98 Revlon's board
adopted several antitakeover measures, including a stock repurchase plan,19
a poison pill rights plan,'00 a lock-up option,101 a no-shop clause, 02 and a
transactions involving corporate control). A white knight is a person or group that makes a
negotiated acquisition of a corporation threatened by a hostile takeover before an unwanted
acquiror can complete its hostile takeover. Id.
97. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79. In Revlon the corporate board of Revlon sought
interested parties to purchase Revlon. Id. at 177. In the board's search for a white knight,
the Revlon board negotiated a leveraged buyout by Forstmann Little. Id. at 178.
98. See id. at 176-79. In Revlon the corporate directors sought expertise from Revlon's
legal counsel and Revlon's investment banking firm before the Revlon board approved the
defensive strategy. Id. at 176-79. Revlon's investment banker counseled the corporate board
that Pantry Pride's tender offer was grossly inadequate, that Pantry Pride was financing the
takeover with junk bonds, and that Pantry Pride intended to dissolve Revlon. Id. at 176-77.
Furthermore, the investment banker warned Revlon's directors that the acquisition and dis-
solution of Revlon by Pantry Pride would benefit Pantry Pride at the expense of Revlon's
shareholders. Id.
99. Id. at 177. In Revlon the Revlon board approved a stock repurchase plan that
authorized Revlon to purchase 5 million of the 30 million outstanding shares of Revlon
common stock. Id.
100. Id. at 178; see supra note 81 (discussing typical rights plan). In Revlon the rights
plan that the Revlon board of directors approved entitled Revlon shareholders to receive as a
dividend one note purchase right per share of Revlon outstanding common stock. Revlon, 506
A.2d 176-77. The Revlon rights plan would trigger unless a tender offer contained a minimum
share price for Revlon common stock of $65. Id. at 177. Under the Revlon rights plan, a
holder of a right could exchange one share of Revlon outstanding common stock for Revlon
debt securities having a $65 principal amount, yielding 12% interest, and maturing in one
year. Id. For a shareholder to exercise the right to exchange shares of stock for notes, a
person or investing group had to acquire 20% of Revlon's outstanding common stock for less
than $65 cash per share of stock. Id. The Revlon rights plan, however, authorized the Revlon
board of directors to redeem the rights for $.10 per right before the triggering event occurred.
Id.
101. Id. at 178. In Revlon the Revlon board negotiated a proposed leveraged buyout
agreement with Forstmann Little that included an asset lock-up option. Id. In an asset lock-
up option, a target corporation grants an optionee, generally a white knight, the right to
acquire key assets of the target corporation. BLOCK & BARTON, supra note 45, at 99. Under
Revlon's agreement, Revlon contracted to grant Forstmann Little an option to purchase two
of Revlon's key divisions at prices substantially below market value. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at
178 (Revlon contracted to sell for $525 million two divisions having estimated value of between
$625 million and $700 million). The triggering event for Forstmann Little to exercise the lock-
up option was the acquisition by another investor or group of investors of 40% of Revlon's
outstanding common stock. Id. The Revlon board unanimously approved the leveraged buyout
according to the terms of the agreement. Id. at 179.
102. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. A no-shop provision contained in a leveraged buyout
agreement generally prohibits a corporation targeted for a takeover from actively seeking an
alternative proposal from other potential acquirors. Cherno & Klein, Practicalities of Handling
Litigation in the Context of a Leveraged Buyout, in PLI, LEVERAGED AcQuISITIONS AND
BuyouTs 1986 373 (H. Benjamin & M. Goldberg eds. 1986)(PLI Corporate Law & Practice
Handbook Series No. 510). In Revlon, Revlon's proposed leveraged buyout agreement with
Forstmann Little contained a no-shop provision that required Revlon to negotiate solely with
Forstmann Little and prohibited Revlon from seeking other possible acquirors. Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 175. The Revlon board unanimously approved the leveraged buyout according to the terms
of the agreement. Id. at 179.
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cancellation fee. 03 The Revlon board ultimately approved a leveraged buyout
with Forstmann Little, even though Pantry Pride indicated a willingness to
better any offer of Forstmann Little.'
To prevent the execution of the rights plan, Pantry Pride sought in the
Delaware Court of Chancery to enjoin Revlon from issuing the rights under
the plan to shareholders. 05 After the Revlon board approved the leveraged
buyout with Forstmann Little, Pantry Pride amended its complaint to
challenge the Revlon directors' decisions to approve the lock-up option and
the cancellation fee and to issue the rights.1 6 The Delaware Court of
Chancery upheld the Revlon board's decision to adopt the rights plan, but
sustained Pantry Pride's challenge to the lock-up option, the no-shop clause,
and the cancellation fee. 07 The directors of Revlon, subsequently, appealed
the court of chancery's injunction of the defensive measures to the Delaware
Supreme Court. 03
103. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178. In the proposed leveraged buyout agreement in Revlon
the Revlon board agreed to pay into an escrow account $25 million for Forstmann Little to
receive if Revlon rescinded Forstmann Little's acquisition agreement or another acquiror
purchased 207 or more of Revlon stock. Id. The Revlon board unanimously approved the
leveraged buyout according to the terms of the agreement. Id. at 179.
104. See id. at 178 (approving leveraged buyout with Forstmann Little); supra notes 99-
103 (discussing terms of Revlon's leveraged buyout agreement with Forstmann Little). In
Revlon Forstmann Little offered $57.25 cash per share of Revlon common stock. Revlon, 506
A.2d at 178. As conditions of its offer, Forstmann Little demanded that the Revlon board
accept the lock-up option, the no-shop provision, and the cancellation fee, agree not to
participate in the merger, and immediately approve the leveraged buyout. Id. at 178-79. In
Revlon Pantry Pride, subsequent to the Revlon board's approval of the leveraged buyout by
Forstmann Little, offered $58 per cash per share of Revlon stock. Id.
105. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178-79. In Revlon the Revlon board approved the poison pill
rights plan during a meeting on August 19, 1985. Id. at 176-77. On August 22 Pantry Pride
unsuccessfully petitioned the Delaware Court of Chancery for a preliminary injunction barring
the execution of the rights plan. Id. at 179. Pantry Pride challenged the court of chancery's
holding to protect the Revlon board's adoption of the rights plan. Id. at 180. The Revlon
board, subsequently, resolved during a meeting on October 3 to redeem the rights if Revlon
successfully negotiated a leveraged buyout with Forstmann Little. Id. at 181. The Revlon
board on October 12 added a condition to the rights' redemption which provided that Revlon
receive a cash tender offer for at least $57.25 per share. Id. On appeal the Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that the board's adoption of the rights plan was a moot issue because all
offers subsequent to October 12 were above $57.25. Id.
106. Id. at 181.
107. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 501 A.2d 1239, 1247, 1250-
52 (Del. Ch. 1985). In Revlon the Delaware Court of Chancery held that because the Revlon
board reasonably was concerned that Pantry Pride would use junk bond financing to cause
the dissolution of Revlon, the business judgment rule protected the Revlon board's decision
to approve the rights plan. Id. The court of chancery enjoined Forstmann Little from purchasing
Revlon's key divisions under the lock-up option, from negotiating solely with Forstmann Little,
and from paying the cancellation fee to Forstmann Little. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175; see supra
notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Revlon's leveraged buyout
agreement with Forstmann Little). The court of chancery found that because Revlon's directors
had breached the duty of care in approving these defensive measures, an injunction should
issue. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 175-76.
108. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
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On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon applied an enhanced
duty of care to determine whether the business judgment rule protected the
board's decision to adopt a comprehensive defensive strategy. 1' 9 After de-
termining that Delaware statutory law authorized the Revlon board to adopt
the rights plan, the Revlon court examined the reasonableness of the Revlon
directors' adoption of the poison pill rights plan." 0 The Delaware Supreme
Court concluded that the Household directors reasonably perceived a threat
to the corporation."' After determining the reasonableness of the perceived
threat to Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court examined the reasonableness
of the board's response to the hostile takeover attempt." 2 The Revlon court
found that in adopting the rights plan, the Revlon board had attempted to
defend the corporation from a tender offer of an inadequate share price
and a division of corporate assets." 3 The court in Revlon concluded,
therefore, that in adopting the rights plan the directors had responded
reasonably to the perceived threat imposed by Pantry Pride."
4
After upholding the Revlon board's adoption of the rights plan, the
Revlon court considered the reasonableness of the board's other defensive
measures."' The court reasoned that after the breakup of Revlon became
inevitable, the directors' duty was to maximize the purchase share price for
Revlon's shareholders." 6 The court found that because the board's defensive
109. See id. at 180 (examining whether directors had authority to adopt defensive
measures, whether directors reasonably perceived threat to corporation, and whether directors'
decision to adopt defensive measures was reasonable); infra notes 110-18 and accompanying
text (discussing enhanced duty of care in Revlon); supra notes 65-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Unocal's heightened duty of care).
110. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81 (finding that Delaware corporate statute gave board
of directors authority to manage affairs of corporation and to enter contracts); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1974) (authorizing board to manage corporate affairs); id. § 122 (authorizing
board of directors to enter contracts on behalf of corporation).
111. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81. In Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court found that
because Revlon's investment banker counseled the Revlon board that Pantry Pride intended
to finance the takeover of Revlon with junk bonds and to dissolve Revlon after the acquisition,
the Revlon board reasonably believed that Pantry Pride presented a threat to Revlon. Id.
112. Id. at 181.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 180-81 (finding that directors' adoption of rights plan benefited share-
holders because rights plan partially caused Pantry Pride to raise its bid from $42 per share
to $58 per share). Although upholding the reasonableness of the Revlon rights plan, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Revlon found the usefulness of the rights plan a moot issue
because the Revlon board resolved to redeem the rights if any investor offered to buy Revlon
for $57.25 or more per share of stock. Id. at 181; see supra note 104 (discussing Revlon
board's resolution to redeem rights).
115. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181. In Revlon the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
Revlon directors' approval of the self-tender for 10 million shares did not breach the directors'
duty of care because the self-tender was a reasonable response to Pantry Pride's initial,
inadequate offer of $47.50 per share. Id.
116. Id. at 182. The Revlon court determined that the breakup of Revlon was evident
when Pantry Pride continually tried to purchase Revlon stock for an increasingly higher price
and when the Revlon board resolved to negotiate a merger with a white knight. Id.
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strategy diminished the attractiveness of Revlon as a takeover target, the
Revlon board effectively had ended any possible bidding contest that would
maximize Revlon's share price." 7 The Revlon court determined that because
the Revlon board had not acted reasonably in adopting the comprehensive
defensive strategy, the Revlon directors had breached the common-law duty
of care." 8 The Delaware Supreme Court refused, therefore, to allow the
business judgment rule to protect the Revlon directors' approval of a
complete defensive scheme." 9
The Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Unocal, Moran, and Revlon
illustrate recent changes in the application of the traditional business judg-
ment rule. 20 If a court had applied the standard of care in section 13.1-
690 of the VSCA to the directors in Unocal and Moran, the directors in
Unocal and Moran would not have breached this statutory standard of
care. 12 1 The circumstances in Unocal and Moran indicate that the directors
117. Id. at 182-84.
118. Id. The Revlon court held that because the entire defensive scheme consisting of
the lock-up option, the no-shop provision, and the cancellation fee virtually precluded an open
bidding contest for Revlon and precluded Revlon shareholders from receiving the highest
possible price for their shares, the directors had breached their fiduciary duty of care to
shareholders. Id. at 182. The Revlon court held that the directors, therefore, breached the
duty of care to Revlon's shareholders. Id. In addition to holding that the Revlon directors
breached the duty of care, the Revlon court found that the directors breached the duty of
loyalty. Id.
In Revlon the Revlon board responded to Pantry Pride's initial tender offer with a self-
tender offer to exchange each tendered share of common stock for one senior debt security
with a $47.50 principal amount, an 11.75% interest rate, and a 10-year maturity (Exchange
Notes), and 1/10 of a share of $9.00 cumulative convertible preferred stock having a value of
$100 per share. Id. at 177. During the struggle for control of Revlon, the value of the
Exchange Notes decreased and holders of the Exchange Notes threatened to sue the Revlon
board. Id. at 182. The Delaware Supreme Court found that in bargaining with Revlon for the
lock-up option in the leveraged buyout contract, Forstmann Little promised to shore up the
value of the previously issued Exchange Notes to deter the Exchange Noteholders from suing
the Revlon board. Id. The Revlon court held, therefore, that by allowing considerations of
self-interest to influence the Revlon board's decision to approve the lock-up option, the board
breached its duty of loyalty to the corporation and its shareholders. Id.
119. Id. at 185.
120. See id. at 180 (placing burden of proof on directors to show reasonableness of
comprehensive defensive strategy in response to specific takeover before applying traditional
business judgment rule); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (placing burden on directors to prove
reasonableness of approval of prospective poison pill rights plan before applying traditional
business judgment rule); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (transferring burden to directors to prove
reasonableness of selective self-tender offer before applying traditional business judgment rule);
supra notes 58-119 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which Delaware Supreme Court
reallocated directors' burden of proof under business judgment rule in takeover situations).
121. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355-57 (ascertaining whether business judgment rule
protected directors' adoption of prospective poison pill rights plan); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-
57 (examining whether business judgment rule protected directors' approval of selective self-
tender offer to oppose hostile takeover was reasonable); VA. CoDa Am. § 13.1-690 (1985)
(requiring directors to discharge duties as directors in good faith business judgment in best
interests of corporation); supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text (examining standard of
care under VSCA).
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acted in good faith business judgment and relied in good faith on reports
of legal counsel and investment bankers. 122 In addition, under the facts of
Revlon a court applying the VSCA's standard of care probably would not
have found that the Revlon directors breached the VSCA's standard of care
in approving the rights plan because the directors adopted in good faith the
poison pill rights plan in response to a perceived inadequate tender offer.2
3
The directors in Revlon probably would have violated the standard of care
under the VSCA, however, in accepting terms in the leveraged buyout
agreement that severely restricted Revlon's ability to maximize the share
price for Revlon shareholders. 24 The Revlon directors, however, had a duty
to maximize the share price for Revlon stock and the board apparently
breached this duty by accepting a restrictive leveraged buyout agreement.125
In approving the leveraged buyout agreement with Forstmann Little, the
Revlon board foreclosed the opportunity to acquire a higher share price for
Revlon stock even though another potential acquiror offered a higher price
per share. 126 The Revlon directors, therefore, did not fulfill their fiduciary
duties to the corporation or its shareholders because the Revlon directors
did not act in good faith for the best interests of the corporation. 27 Thus,
122. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355-57 (finding that directors' adoption of prospective
poison pill rights plan was reasonable); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954-57 (finding that directors'
approval of selective self-tender offer to oppose hostile takeover was reasonable); supra notes
62-63 and accompanying text (discussing Unocal board's adoption of selective self-tender offer
as defensive measure against hostile tender offer); supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text
(discussing Household board's approval of prospective poison pill rights plan); supra notes 17-
25 and accompanying text (discussing VSCA's requirement of good faith business judgment
and authorization of directors' reliance on others in making corporate decisions).
123. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81 (examining whether directors' approval of rights
plan to thwart hostile takeover was reasonable); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(VSCA's
standard of care); supra notes 100 and accompanying text (discussing Revlon board's adoption
of poison pill rights plan to contest hostile tender offer); supra notes 17-25 and accompanying
text (discussing VSCA's requirement of good faith business judgment and authorization of
directors' reliance on others in making corporate decisions).
124. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 181-85 (ascertaining whether directors' approval of leveraged
buyout agreement severely restricting marketability of corporation involved in takeover was
reasonable); supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing defensive scheme adopted
by Revlon board); supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing VSCA's requirement
of good faith business judgment and authorization of directors' reliance on others in making
corporate decisions).
125. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183-84 (finding that in approving leveraged buyout
agreement that failed to benefit shareholders by maximizing share price of corporation involved
in takeover, directors breached duty of care); supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text
(discussing terms of leveraged buyout agreement adopted by Revlon board).
126. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183-84 (finding that by approving leveraged buyout
agreement despite Pantry Pride's offer to increase purchase price per share of Revlon stock,
directors breached duty of care); supra note 104 and accompanying text (noting that Pantry
Pride offered price for Revlon stock that was higher than price accepted by Revlon directors
in leveraged buyout agreement).
127. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 184 (holding that directors breached duty of care under
Delaware law); supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (reviewing Revlon board's adoption
of comprehensive defensive strategy in struggle for corporate control).
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in accepting the restrictive terms in the leveraged buyout agreement, the
Revlon directors would have violated the standard of care in section 13.1-
690 of the VSCA.'28
Although the VSCA attempts to codify the traditional business judgment
rule, section 13.1-690 of the VSCA provides the appropriate burden of
proof that courts should apply to challenges of directors' actions, including
directors' actions in response to takeovers. 29 Unlike the Delaware Supreme
Court, which has required directors to bear a threshold burden of proving
the reasonableness of a corporate board's decision in takeover situations,
the VSCA does not require directors to bear an initial burden of proof.
30
Rather, section 13.1-690(d) of the VSCA places the initial burden of proving
that directors have breached the duty of care for any decision on the person
claiming the directors' breach.' Because the VSCA places the initial burden
of proof on the plaintiff, more decisions of corporate boards are likely to
pass judicial scrutiny.
In addition to requiring the plaintiff to prove initially that the directors
reasonably did not respond to a takeover attempt, the VSCA avoids the
concept of objective reasonableness in the statutory standard of care.
32
Unlike the RMBCA's standard of care, which requires courts to construct
a fictitious framework to determine the reasonableness of directors' actions,
the VSCA's standard of care requires courts to examine directors' subjective
good faith business judgment. 33 Because courts applying the VSCA only
will consider directors' good faith, the standard of care for directors under
the VSCA apparently is lower than the standard of care applied in Delaware
or under the RMBCA.114 The VSCA's subjective standard of care will reduce
128. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(directors' subjective standard of care under
VSCA).
129. See id. (providing standard of care for corporate directors); supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text (discussing standard of care under VSCA).
130. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(D) (1985)(placing burden of proving directors' alleged
breach of care under VSCA on plaintiff); cf. supra notes 58-119 and accompanying text (in
shifting initial burden of proof to directors in takeover situations, Delaware courts have
required directors to prove reasonableness of board's response to takeover threat).
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(D) (1985).
132. See id. § 13.1-690 (requiring directors to discharge duties in good faith business
judgment); supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (noting that General Assembly chose
subjective standard of good faith rather than objective standard of reasonableness in good
faith).
133. See supra notes 20-21 (discussing actions that courts must take to apply standard
of care under VSCA); supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (discussing actions that courts
must take to apply standard of care under RMBCA).
134. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-85 (requiring directors who adopted rights plan and
accepted restrictive leveraged buyout agreement to satisfy objective standard of care under
Delaware law); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355-57 (requiring directors who approved prospective
poison pill rights plan to meet objective standard of care); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-57
(requiring directors to act reasonably in making self-tender offer for Unocal's stock ); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(directors' subjective standard of care under VSCA); REvisED
MODEL BusnwEss CORP. AcT § 8.30 (1985)(directors' objective standard of care under RMBCA);
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the possibility that courts will second-guess directors' decisions because by
acting in good faith, directors satisfy the standard of care in section 13.1-
690 of the VSCA. 35
Even when a court determines that directors have breached the standard
of care in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA, directors may seek, or have the
right to receive, indemnification from the corporation under the expanded
indemnification provisions of the VSCA. 36 The VSCA provides directors
with four alternatives for seeking indemnification from the corporation.
37
Section 13.1-697 of the VSCA authorizes corporations to indemnify directors
who have acted in good faith and believed either that their conduct was in
the best interest of the corporation when they were acting in their official
capacity,138 or that their conduct at least did not oppose the best interests
of the corporation when they were not acting in their official capacity. 3 9
The indemnification provisions in section 13.1-697 of the VSCA shadow
the standard of care provisions in section 13.1-690 of the VSCA by requiring
directors to act in good faith and with the interests of the corporation in
mind.'40 Section 13.1-697(D) of the VSCA, however, proscribes corporations
from indemnifying directors when a court finds the directors liable in an
action brought by, or on the behalf of, the corporation,' 4' or when the
directors improperly received a personal benefit from the transaction.
42
Thus, section 13.1-697 of the VSCA, which authorizes corporations to
indemnify directors who have satisfied the duty of care in section 13.1-690,
is one alternative available to directors seeking indemnification from the
corporation.143  In addition to authorizing Virginia corporations to indem-
supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing standard of care under VSCA); supra
notes 26-29 and accompanying text (discussing standard of care under RMBCA) supra notes
58-119 and accompanying text (discussing actions of corporate boards involved in takeover
situations).
135. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(directors' objective standard of care under
VSCA); Manning, supra note 37, at 1500 (noting that standard similar to VSCA's standard
would protect directors who have exercised good faith in making business decisions); supra
notes 17-21 and accompanying text (examining directors' standard of care under VSCA).
136. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-696 to -704 (1985)(VSCA's provisions authorizing
corporations to indemnify directors).
137. See infra notes 138-54 and accompnaying text (discussing directors' rights to
mandatory indemnification, voluntary indemnification, or additional indemnification provided
in articles of incorporation or corporate bylaws).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697(A)(2)(a) (1985). Under section 13.1-696 of the VSCA
directors acting in their role as directors act within their official capacity. Id. § 13.1-696.
139. Id. § 13.1-697(A)(2)(b).
140. Telephone interview with Allen C. Goolsby, III, Primary Drafter of VSCA (Feb. 12,
1987)(stating that indemnification provision in § 13.1-697 of VSCA "tracks" standard of care
provision in § 13.1-690(A) of VSCA). Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (1985) (VSCA's
standard of care provision); with id. § 13.1-697 (VSCA's indemnification of right provision).
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697(D)(1) (1985).
142. Id. § 13.1-697(D)(2).
143. Id. § 13.1-697; see supra notes 138-42 and accompanying text (discussing indemni-
fication under § 13.1-697 of VSCA).
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nify directors who have acted in good faith, the VSCA grants to directors
a conditional right to receive mandatory and discretionary indemnification.'
44
Under section 13.1-698 of the VSCA corporations must indemnify directors
who entirely prevail in a proceeding challenging a corporate board's actions,
provided the articles of incorporation do not limit the director's right to
indemnification. 145 In addition, section 13.1-701 of the VSCA allows a
corporation to indemnify directors when the directors show that they have
a right to indemnification under section 13.1-697 of the VSCA and that the
indemnification is to cover reasonable expenses for defending a challenge
to the directors' actions. 146 The articles of incorporation, however, may limit
directors' rights to discretionary indemnification. 47 Thus, under the VSCA,
directors possess the right to receive indemnification when the directors act
in good faith 48 or successfully defend a challenge of the directors' actions
49
and also may receive voluntary indemnification under section 13.1-701 when
the corporation so desires. 150
In addition to granting directors the right to mandatory and discretion-
ary indemnification, the VSCA provides that a corporation's articles of
incorporation, or a bylaw adopted by the corporation's shareholders, may
144. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-698 (1985)(requiring corporation to indemnify directors);
id. § 13.1-701 (allowing corporation to indemnify directors); Murphy, supra note 9, at 114-15
(discussing indemnification provisions of VSCA).
145. VA. CODE ANI. § 13.1-698 (1985); see CODE COMi'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4,
at 254 (General Assembly intended VSCA to authorize corporations to indemnify directors
only if directors successfully defend all claims against directors). When corporations refuse to
indemnify directors voluntarily, the directors may seek the assistance of a court. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-700 (1985)(authorizing directors to apply to court to order indemnification).
146. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-701 (1985)(authorizing discretionary indemnification);
id. § 13.1-697 (providing circumstances when discretionary indemnification is permissible); see also
CODE Comm'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 256 (commenting on authority of corporations
in VSCA to indemnify directors voluntarily); Murphy, supra note 9, at 115-16 (commenting
that before voluntarily permitting corporation to indemnify directors, court first must determine
that directors are entitled to indemnification and second must determine amount of indemnity).
Section 13.1-701 of the VSCA authorizes a corporation to voluntarily indemnify directors. VA.
CODE ANN. '§ 13.1-701 (1985). For a corporation to voluntarily indemnify directors, one of
four groups of people must determine that indemnification is appropriate under § 13.1-697.
Id. § 13.1-701; see id. § 13.1-697 (authorizing statutory indemnification of directors). Under
section 13.1-701(B) of the VSCA, a majority of the quorum of the disinterested board, a
majority of a committee of disinterested board members, legal counsel selected by a majority
of the disinterested board, or the shareholders of the corporation have the authority to
determine whether the corporation should indemnify directors in a particular situation. Id. §
13.1-701(B).
147. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-701 (1985); see id. § 13.1-698 (authorizing articles of
incorporation to limit corporation's mandatory indemnification of directors).
148. See id. § 13.1-697(A)(2) (1985)(authorizing corporations to indemnify directors who
have acted in good faith); supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text (discussing VSCA's
provision requiring corporations to indemnify directors who have acted in good faith).
149. See VA. CODE ANI. § 13.1-698 (1985)(authorizing corporation to indemnify directors
who entirely prevail in a proceeding challenging a corporate board's actions).
150. See id. § 13.1-701 (authorizing corporation voluntarily to indemnify directors).
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provide for directors' indemnification.15 1 Under section 13.1-704(B) of the
VSCA, a corporation in its articles of incorporation or shareholders in the
corporate bylaws may provide that the corporation indemnify directors
unless the corporate directors are grossly negligent or guilty of willful
misconduct. 152 The Virginia Supreme Court has interpreted gross negligence
to be an overreaching breach of the care that an ordinarily reasonable man
would exercise in similar circumstances.1 53 Thus, although the directors could
not satisfy the requirements for indemnification in other provisions of the
VSCA, directors apparently may receive indemnification when a corporation
provides in its articles of incorporation or its bylaws for indemnification
under section 13.1-704(B) of the VSCA. 154
In enacting the indemnification provisions of the VSCA, the General
Assembly followed very closely the provisions of the RMBCA. i5 5 Like section
13.1-697 of the VSCA, section 8.51 of the RMBCA authorizes corporate
boards voluntarily to indemnify directors who have acted in good faith and
believed either that their conduct was in the best interest of the corporation
151. See id. § 13.1-704(B) (granting corporation authority to provide additional indem-
nification in articles of incorporation for directors who are not grossly negligent or guilty of
willful misconduct); Goolsby & Whitson, Virginia's New Corporate Code, 12 REv. OF SEC. &
CoMMoDrrIEs REG. 147, 154 (1986)(discussing additional indemnification provisions of VSCA).
152. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B) (1985); see CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, app.
4, at 257 (noting that many Virginia corporations commit themselves to provide as much
indemnity as possible); Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 151, at 154 (paraphrasing VSCA's
additional indemnification provisions). Under section 13.1-704(B) of the VSCA directors should
be able to receive additional indemnification for liability in a derivative suit, even though the
General Assembly did not provide expressly in section 13.1-704(B) for indemnity in derivative
suits. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B) (1985); see Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 151, at 154
(summarizing VSCA's indemnification provisions). The General Assembly expressly restricted
indemnification under section 13.1-697 of the VSCA for liability in derivative suits to cases
arising under that section. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-697(D)(1) (1985); Goolsby & Whitson, supra
note 151, at 154. The General Assembly did not prohibit, however, indemnification of directors
under the additional indemnification provisions of section 13.1-704(B) for liability in derivative
actions. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B)(1) (1985); Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 151, at 154.
Directors breaching the good faith standard of care of § 13.1-690 of the VSCA, therefore,
may receive additional indemnification under the corporation's articles of incorporation. VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B)(1) (1985); Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 151, at 154.
153. See O'Connor v. First Nat'l Investors' Corp., 163 Va. 908, 919-20, 177 S.E. 852,
857 (1935)(noting that gross negligence under Virginia law is directors' failure to exercise
degree of care and diligence that circumstances require for proper performance of managerial
duties); see also Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929)(noting that
under Delaware law directors' standard of care is gross negligence, which is reckless indifference
to or deliberate disregard of stockholders).
154. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B) (1985)(authorizing corporation's articles of
incorporation or bylaws to provide indemnification); supra notes 144-50 and accompanying
text (discussing mandatory and voluntary rights to indemnification under VSCA).
155. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-696 to -704 (1985)(providing directors with
indemnification of right and mandatory, discretionary, and additional indemnification in VSCA);
with REVISED MODEL BusncEss CORP. ACT § 8.50-58 (1985)(providing directors with indemni-
fication of right and mandatory and voluntary indemnification in RMBCA).
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when they were acting in their official capacity,' 56 or that their conduct at
least did not oppose the best interests of the corporation when they were
not acting in their official capacity. 57 Like section 13.1-697(D) of the VSCA,
section 8.51(d) of the RMBCA proscribes a corporate board from indem-
nifying directors whom courts find liable for improper conduct in, or receive
an improper personal benefit from, a transaction.'58 In addition to voluntary
indemnification, section 8.52 of the RMBCA, like sections 13.1-698 and
13.1-701 of the VSCA, requires corporations mandatorily to indemnify
directors when directors successfully defend in a proceeding all challenges
to the directors' corporate actions.
159
The most significant difference between the indemnification provisions
of the VSCA and the RMBCA is the potential for corporations or share-
holders, in addition to mandatorily and voluntarily indemnifying directors,
to provide for indemnification in the corporation's articles of incorporation
or bylaws under the VSCA. When a corporation's articles of incorporation
or bylaws authorize indemnification under section 13.1-704(B) of the VSCA,
section 13.1-697(D) of the VSCA, which prohibits a corporation from
indemnifying directors who are liable in an action brought by the corporation
or who received a personal benefit from the transaction, is meaningless
because corporations can indemnify directors found liable except when
directors were grossly negligent or guilty of willful misconduct. 16 By pros-
cribing corporations from indemnifying directors for grossly negligent be-
havior, however, section 13.1-704(B) of the VSCA proscribes a corporation
from indemnifying directors who do not act as reasonable persons. 6 1 The
156. REVISED MODEL Busnmss CoRP. ACT § 8.51(a)(1) (1985); see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
697(A)(2) (1985)(paralleling provision in RMBCA granting directors indemnification of right).
Under section 8.50(5) of the RMBCA directors act within in their official capacity when they
act in their role as directors. REVISED MODEL Busnass CoP. ACT § 8.50(1) (1985). The
RMBCA provides a procedure for corporations to determine whether voluntary indemnification
is proper. Id. § 8.55. Under section 8.55 of the RMBCA a corporation first must determine
whether directors have a right to indemnification under section 8.51 and then authorize
indemnification in the proper amount. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-701 (1985)(providing
discretionary indemnification similar to RMBCA).
157. REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CoRP. ACT § 8.51(a)(2) (1985); see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
697(A)(2) (1985)(containing voluntary indemnification provision identical to provision in RMBCA).
158. REVISED MODEL Busmwss CoRP. ACT § 8.51(d) (1985); see VA. CODE AN. § 13.1-
697(D) (1985)(prohibiting corporate board from indemnifying directors when court finds
directors liable in action brought by corporation or when directors received improper personal
benefit from transaction).
159. REVISED MODEL Busss CORP. ACT § 8.52 (1985). Under either the voluntary or
mandatory indemnification provisions of the RMBCA, directors may apply to a court for
assistance in receiving appropriate indemnification. Id. § 8.54; see VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-700
(1985) (authorizing directors to petition court for assistance to acquire indemnification).
160. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B) (1985)(authorizing corporations to provide
additional indemnification to directors except for gross negligence or willful misconduct); id.
§ 13.1-697(D) (prohibiting corporation from indemnifying directors whom courts find liable).
161. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-704(B) (1985)(proscribing directors' indemnification for
gross negligence); supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing concept of gross negli-
gence).
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language of section 13.1-704(B) that requires directors to act as reasonable
persons to receive additional indemnification conflicts, however, with the
General Assembly's intent in section 13.1-690 not to require directors to act
as reasonable persons.162 Thus, under the VSCA, a corporation may indem-
nify directors who have breached the statutory standard of care by not
demonstrating good faith business judgment but whose conduct has not
reached the level of gross negligence. 163 The RMBCA, on the contrary,
explicitly forbids a corporation from indemnifying directors who are liable
for breaching the directors' duty of care under section 8.30(a).1
64
Because the VSCA provides a subjective standard of care and expansive
indemnification provisions, the VSCA contains attractive provisions for
directors.6 5 The new statutory standard of care and the expansive indem-
nification provisions will encourage a greater number of competent direc-
tors-directors who otherwise might decline from serving as directors because
of unnecessary risks of personal liability-to participate in corporate gov-
ernance.' 66 Because the standard of care under the VSCA is lower than the
Virginia common-law standard of care, directors may no longer have such
a great fear of personal liability. The decreasing fear of personal liability
may result in greater financial benefits to corporations because directors
will be more willing to take risks that they otherwise would avoid because
of the fear that courts would scrutinize the decisions of the corporate
board. 67 The lower standard of care in the VSCA, however, apparently will
result in less accountability for corporate directors because directors need
only to discharge their duties as directors in their subjective good faith
business judgment of what is in the best interests of the corporation. 68
Even though the VSCA in section 13.1-690 contains a lower standard of
care, directors of Virginia corporations realistically will not have less of a
personal incentive to perform managerial duties in the best interests of the
corporation. Directors, instead, generally will continue to fulfill their obli-
gations as directors to the best of their abilities regardless of the standard
of care and attempt to further corporate interests in making corporate
decisions.
DAVID M. SCHiLLI
162. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(requiring directors to exercise only good faith
business judgment); CODE COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. 4, at 249 (General Assembly
intentionally avoided using term "reasonable" in VSCA's standard of care); supra notes 17-
21 and accompanying text (examining VSCA's subjective standard of care).
163. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(standard of care in VSCA).
164. RFvISED MODEL BusNass CORP. ACT § 8.51(d) (1985).
165. Goolsby & Whitson, supra note 151, at 147.
166. Id. at 154.
167. See Fischel, supra note 12, at 1439 (positing that traditional business judgment rule
and accordingly objective standard of care remove influence on directors to act cautiously in
making corporate decisions).
168. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690 (1985)(requiring directors to act in good faith, rather
than as ordinarily prudent persons); Manning, supra note 37, at 1500 (noting that directors
who must satisfy good faith business judgment standard generally would not be liable for
breaches of duty of care).
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